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PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CUPIDITY:  
BERLE AND MEANS RE-VISIONED 
Allan C. Hutchinson* 
 “The Berle-Means corporation...is an adaptation, not a 
necessity.” 
Mark Roe1 
The seventy-fifth anniversary of the publication of Adolph A. Berle 
and Gardiner C. Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property in 1932 will soon be upon us. This classic work is 
universally acknowledged as one of law’s canonical texts. While it 
has aptly been described as “arguably the most influential book in 
U.S. business history,”2 its importance is not merely as an 
historical curiosity: it has remained a mainstay of corporate law 
                                            
 * Distinguished Research Professor and Associate Dean (Research), Osgoode 
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful to Michael 
Abdelkerim, Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Daved Muttart, Lisa Philipps, Poonam Puri, 
Paul Saguil, Tony Vanduzer, John Cioffi, and Peer Zumbansen for their critical 
comments and helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to participants in 
seminars and workshops at the universities of Western Ontario, Queens, 
Ottawa, Windsor, Victoria, Boston, British Columbia, Toronto and Harvard. 
 1 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL 
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 286-87 (1994). 
 2 Peter Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. 
106 at 114 (March/April 1991). In a similar vein, it has been said that “no field 
of American law has ever been so totally dominated by one work as the 
corporation law area by the Berle and Means classic.” Henry G. Manne, 
Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American Corporate Law in 
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED 
OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 219 at 223 (Gerard Radnitzky and 
Peter Bernholz eds. 1987). 
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and scholarship up to the present day. While its detailed analysis 
of corporate governance and the particulars of its reform proposals 
have become less important over time, it still exerts extensive 
conceptual influence. The fact that it is no longer referenced as 
frequently is less an indication of its dated quality and more a 
testament to its foundational status. Indeed, it would be no 
exaggeration to report that, as befits a book of its stature, The 
Modern Corporation continues to provide the general intellectual 
framework within which much traditional thinking about 
corporate governance in both law and business takes place: this is 
as true for the status quo’s defenders as well as its detractors. It is 
clear, therefore, that any serious effort to appreciate, let alone 
transform, the theory and practice of contemporary corporate 
governance must pay close and critical attention to The Modern 
Corporation. 
Recent events in the corporate world have underlined the urgency 
of attending to the conceptual foundations of present and future 
practice. This is not only because of the scandals and calamities 
which have occurred, but also because of the enacted reforms’ 
relative failure to address the deeper sources of the crisis which 
face corporate governance: the causes and the reputed cure are part 
of the same informing paradigm.3 Although theoretical posturing 
is considered indulgent by the tough-minded sensibilities of 
corporate actors, the current practice of corporate governance is in 
thrall to a very partial cluster of theoretical premises: “practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist.”4 Although Berle and Means’ work was intended to 
                                            
 3 Some commentators, of course, maintain that those reforms went too far. See, 
for example, Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1522 at 1529 (2006). 
 4 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, 
INTEREST AND MONEY ch.24 (1936). He went on to conclude that “madmen 
in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some 
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redirect the governance of corporate affairs away from furthering 
private cupidity and towards advancing public policy, their 
enslaving insights have done more harm than good; they have 
tended to reinforce the primacy of private cupidity or, perhaps 
more accurately, allowed subsequent theorists to prefer the 
pursuit of private cupidity by equating it with the development of 
public policy. This is not only unfortunate, but also unnecessary. 
Although Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation forms the 
bedrock of the prevailing paradigm in corporate law and 
governance, it also contains some very suggestive materials from 
which to construct an alternative and more democratic way of 
proceeding which actually subverts and transforms the established 
model. In this essay, therefore, I want to celebrate The Modern 
Corporation, but also to lament the enduring influence of its 
received understanding on corporate law scholarship and practice. 
If Berle and Means are to avoid becoming ‘defunct’ and remain 
relevant to contemporary ideas and practice, it must be more as a 
conceptual corrective and less as a traditional prop. 
I. 1932 AND ALL THAT 
Although Berle and Means’ work had a prescient quality to it, The 
Modern Corporation was very much a product of the 1920s. The 
first quarter of the Twentieth Century had witnessed a massive 
and rapid surge in America’s capital economy. Along with this rise 
in economic development and prosperity, there was a shift in 
production from small businesses to huge conglomerates; the 
accumulation of vast fortunes and the concentration of corporate 
power in elite hands were hallmarks of the period. However, 
culminating in the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great 
Depression, this era of unfettered capitalism was beginning to 
                                                                                                                
academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested 
interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of 
ideas. Sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for 
good or evil.” 
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collapse under its own burgeoning weight. By the late 1920s, the 
juggernaut of corporate organisation was being more closely 
scrutinised and its pervasive influence challenged. In what began 
as a research project for the Social Science Research Council of 
America, Columbia law professor Adolph A. Berle, Jr. sought out 
an economist with a statistical bent to work with so as to produce 
a more empirical and technical understanding of corporate 
development: he was paired up with Gardiner C. Means. Their 
unusual collaboration sought to appreciate the corporation as a 
social institution as well as an economic organisation. This huge 
undertaking was projected to be “the work of a lifetime” and The 
Modern Corporation was to be the opening volume “intended 
primarily to break ground on the relation which corporations bear 
to property.”5 As such, it was meant to be the first and not the last 
word on the corporation as a human institution. 
Mean’s extensive mapping of the contemporary corporate terrain 
was novel and revealing. In an examination of the 200 largest non-
financial corporations in 1929, he found that in only 11% of the 
firms did the largest owner hold a majority of the firm’s shares. 
Further, establishing ownership of 20% of the stock as a threshold 
minimum for control, it was discovered that 44% of those firms 
had no individual who owned that much of the stock. These 88 
firms which were classified as management-controlled also 
managed to account for 58% of the total assets held among the top 
200 corporations. As analysed by both Berle and Means, the upshot 
of these statistical insights was that there were two significant and 
                                            
 5 Preface (1932) in ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY liii (Rev. ed. 1968) 
(hereinafter all page references are in parenthesis in the text). For two very 
different approaches to the history of the modern corporation, see JOHN 
MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A 
SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003) and JOEL BAKAN, 
THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER (2004). 
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pressing features to be addressed—the growing concentration of 
power within a relatively small number of large corporations and 
the increasing dispersal of stock ownership resulting in a widening 
gulf between share ownership and executive control within those 
corporations. While each trend was important in itself, their 
combination persuaded Berle and Means that a corporate 
revolution had occurred and that a new frame of reference was 
required in order to appreciate it fully and deal with its legal and 
social ramifications. However, although the fact of growing 
corporate power provided the informing backdrop, the major 
thrust of their report was the struggle to come to terms with the 
separation of ownership and control. Indeed, this characterization 
of the challenge became “the master problem for research” in 
corporate law.6 The growing concentration of corporate power was 
more a contextual concern than a central problematic, presumably 
to be explored more fully and directly in a later, but never realised 
volume.  
In examining the organisational implications of the historical shift 
from family-owned firms to large widely-held corporations in 
which there was separation of ownership and control, Berle and 
Means continued, as they refined, a traditional view on corporate 
governance. They insisted quite straightforwardly that 
corporations ought to be run by the management whose powers 
were to be held in trust for stockholders as the sole beneficiaries of 
the corporate enterprise. As the separation between share 
ownership and managerial control was becoming increasingly 
wide, they worried about “the concentration of economic power” 
creating “empires” which permit “a new form of absolutism” to 
be exercised by “the new princes” and “economic autocrats” of 
controlling management (116). In an arresting phrase, they noted 
that “a Machiavelli writing today would have very little interest 
                                            
 6 Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
923 at 923 (1984). 
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in princes, and every interest in the Standard Oil Company of 
Indiana.”7 Indeed, they were so concerned about the power of 
management that they compare the board of directors to “a 
communist committee of commissars” and cast the director as 
someone who “more nearly resembles the communist on mode of 
thought than he does the protagonist of private property” (245). In 
combating such disturbing consequences of the shift in corporate 
holdings, Berle and Means maintained that the primary role of 
corporate law was to ensure that “all powers granted to a 
corporation or the management of a corporation, or to any group 
within the corporation, ... are necessarily and at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders” 
(220). Because it is the liquidity of their property which most 
concerns shareholders, not their involvement in the corporation’s 
management, corporate law could rightly arrogate to itself the task 
of acting as general overseers of management and subscribe to the 
commitment that “a corporation should be run for the benefit of 
its owners, the stockholders” (293). 
For Berle and Means, therefore, the task for corporate law was to 
work out how best to shape corporate law so that it could respond 
effectively and efficiently to the intricate and operational 
consequences of the divide between diffuse owners and self-
serving managers. Put more bluntly, their main focus was upon 
ensuring that managers do not ignore the absentee owners and line 
their own pockets at the expense of the shareholders. Although 
retaining a continuing, if partial, faith in the market as a means to 
discipline management and to protect shareholders’ expectations, 
they pinned their reform hopes on judicial intervention to 
discipline managers in the name of shareholder confidence. With 
varying degrees of success, this was to be achieved by mandating 
                                            
 7 A.A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, Corporations and the Public Investor, 
20 AM. ECON. REV. 54 at 71 (1930). For an excellent biographical account, see 
JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF 
AN AMERICAN ERA (1987). 
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the primacy of shareholder voting in all important corporate 
decisions and the imposition of fiduciary duties on management 
(i.e., demanding that managers place the corporation’s interests 
ahead of their own). In effect, they gambled on the willingness and 
suitability of courts to fashion and police a series of strict and 
equitable obligations such that “corporation law becomes in 
substance a branch of the law of trusts” (242).  
However, it is Berle and Means’ framing of the ownership/control 
problem as the central dynamic of corporate law and organisation 
that is the main legacy of The Modern Corporation. 
Notwithstanding the almost universal acceptance in the ensuing 
75 years of the accuracy of their diagnosis of the ills that afflict 
corporate governance, agreement with their descriptive 
observations has not been matched by implementation of their 
prescriptive recommendations. While their mode of proceeding 
has had some measure of influence, it has not carried the day; they 
are something of “a policy relic.”8 Its incorporation into corporate 
law has been half-hearted at best and its capacity to restrain 
corporate malfeasance has clearly been lacking in practical effect. 
                                            
 8 William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered At the Century’s Turn, 26 
J. CORP. L. 737 at 739 (2001). Berle and Means’ concerns about the 
owners/managers divide was echoed by critics of the democratic process’s 
operation more generally. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942) and SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, 
Introduction in ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 15-39 (1962). 
However, not all commentators saw the disjuncture as problematic, but viewed 
the greater dispersal of capital as a harbinger of ‘people’s capitalism’ and greater 
democracy. See Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern 
Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311 (1957). See generally Mark Mizruchi, 
Berle and Means Revisited: the Governance and Power of Large U.S. 
Corporations, 33 THEORY AND SOCIETY 579 (2004). For a very different 
account of corporate history and politics, see Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without 
Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1861 
(2003). She notes that “by focusing on entrepreneurs and investors, they helped 
legitimize a conception of value or wealth that was detached from work and 
labor.” Id. at 1868. 
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More recently, commentators have turned to the market by way of 
possible take-overs and performance-based compensation as 
further modes of discipline such that inefficient managers would 
be replaced by profit-seeking shareholders. 
In large part, the relative failure of Berle and Means’ reform 
proposals is because they could not or would not move beyond the 
‘private property’ logic of the traditional paradigm; profit 
maximization and the protection of shareholders’ ownership 
entitlements were still the order of the day. Their support for 
governmental and judicial intervention was premised on the 
limiting premise that these official agencies would act as public 
surrogates for private shareholders’ control. In anointing managers 
as the “princes of industry” (4) and recommending that they must 
serve the community as a whole by ordering their affairs “on the 
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity” (313), there was 
the distinct whiff of noblesse oblige around even relatively liberal 
boardrooms in matters of corporate governance. Indeed, with their 
the commitment to the idea that shareholders are ‘the owners of 
the corporation’, Berle and Means offer a lament for the lost 
‘active’ shareholder who is left with “a mere symbol of 
ownership” (65). After all, the full title of their book is The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property. For them, a private 
property regime provides the best incentive to ensure that property 
is used efficiently in the sense that “the quest for profits will spur 
the owner of industrial property to its effective use” (9). 
Accordingly, the central thrust of Berle and Means’ reform 
proposals was to close the gap between owners and management 
as much as the legal imposition of equitable duties can do so as to 
emulate or approximate the ideal situation of owner-managers. 
Their’s was a less of a break with the tradition of ‘shareholder 
primacy’ and more of a continuance of it. There may well have 
been a ‘corporate revolution’ by 1932, but Berle and Means were 
far from revolutionary in their response. 
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II. CHRONICLE OF AN END FORETOLD 
Much has changed since 1932 in the world of capitalist economies 
and corporate organisation. If the forces of ‘concentration’ and 
‘separation’ were in play in Berle and Mean’s day, they have been 
supplemented by others and become even more powerful and 
relentless today—institutional investors, take-overs and mergers, 
financial entrepreneurship, and the like. Yet, if Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman are to be believed, the last few years have 
witnessed ‘the end of corporate history’. Echoing the apocalyptic 
pronouncements of Francis Fukuyama from a decade earlier, they 
declaimed in 2001 that “the basic law of corporate governance—
indeed, most of corporate law—has achieved a high degree of ... 
continuing convergence toward a single, standard model ... [and] 
there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term 
shareholder value.”9 This seemed wishful thinking on the part of 
Hansmann and Kraakman; their reasoned analysis was leavened by 
ideological advocacy. At best, it can be reported that the 
mainstream of corporate lawyers and commentators have settled 
                                            
 9 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). No mention is made of Francis Fukuyama who 
(in)famously argued that the world had beaten a path to American liberal 
democracy on the unfolding carpet of a Universal History whose woof and warp 
comprise the motifs of political individualism and economic privatism. While it 
is incompletely implemented and capable of further refinement, the ideal of 
liberal democracy marks the final end of History: “the modern liberal 
democratic world ... is free of contradictions” and “at the end of history, there 
are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.” F. 
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 48 (1992). For a 
powerful critique of this viewpoint, see J. DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX: 
THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL 56, 69 and 78 (P. Kamuf trans. 1994). Even Fukuyama 
himself has had serious second thoughts about his original ‘end of history’ 
thesis. See AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND 
THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE LEGACY (2006).  
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upon ‘shareholder primacy’ as the preferred normative goal. This is 
less because it has achieved an objective and universal status, but 
more because few are prepared or have sufficient incentive to 
resist the economic and political clout of those championing its 
contemporary hegemony. It may well be a descriptive fact that 
“governance practice is largely a matter of private ordering”,10 but 
that does not mean that it should be accepted as a prescriptive 
recommendation. Yet, even in the few years since 2001, events in 
the corporate world have not only confounded Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s optimism, but have highlighted how fragile and 
defective the reliance on ‘shareholder primacy’ has become. 
Despite these end-of-history prognostications, the fact remains 
that Berle and Means’ account of the problem to be solved still 
informs most corporate law thinking. Almost all scholars and 
commentators are still in the grip of a traditional mind-set in 
which the interests of shareholders are paramount: ‘shareholder 
primacy’ remains the guiding light of corporate law and 
scholarship. However, what has changed over the past 75 years is 
that there have been varied and umpteen efforts to explain and 
rationalize this informing mandate so that it can have the largest 
possible claim to normative legitimacy. Along with a continuing 
reliance on the ‘private property’ rationale, there are three other 
                                            
 10 Id. at 455. For a more interesting spin on the ‘historical progress’ of corporate 
law scholarship, see Brain Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) 
Scholarship, 63 CAMB. L.J. 456 (2004). While there are strong pressures towards 
convergence, the history and political economy of comparative corporate 
governance strongly suggests that there is no particular magic to any particular 
mode of corporate organisation and structure. Advanced economies have 
managed to develop and grow by reliance on a variety of systems of corporate 
governance; there is no one size that fits all or, as importantly, no one size that 
necessarily fits best. See Ronald Dore, William Lazonick, Mary O’Sullivan, 
Varieties of Capitalism in The Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POLICY 102 (1999). 
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dominant arguments relied on by contemporary theorists to 
explain and support the continued reliance on ‘shareholder 
primacy’ as the preferred rationale for corporate law and 
governance; they are ‘market discipline’, ‘social wealth’, and 
‘shareholder democracy’. Each of them is deeply flawed and 
unconvincing; there has been much heat, but little light. 
A. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
The defence of ‘shareholder primacy’ which runs most directly 
from Berle and Means’ ideas is the claim that those who own the 
corporation are entitled to have the corporation operate in their 
interests and receive any resulting profits. While this still has its 
supporters, it has lost much of its argumentative appeal.11 The 
‘private property’ rationale misconstrues both the particular 
import of owning shares in a corporation and the general 
consequences of property ownership. While there can be little 
doubt that shareholders have property rights over shares which 
can traditionally be treated as ownership, it does mean not that 
they, therefore, have similar ownership rights over the 
corporation. For instance, the fact that I buy a lottery ticket does 
not mean that I own part of the lottery corporation. While I do 
own the lottery ticket and have certain traditional property rights 
which accompany that (e.g., to destroy it or give it to someone 
else), it does not mean that my relation to the lottery corporation 
                                            
 11 See Symposium, Corporations and Private Property, 26 J. L. & ECON. 235 
(1983). For a sampling of the theorists who champion ‘shareholder primacy’, see 
Jonathon Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, (1991) 
21 STETSON L. REV. 23 ; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 
(1993); Mark Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial 
Organization, (2001) U. PA. L. REV. 2063; W. Allen, J. Jacobs and L. Strine, The 
Great Takeover Debate : A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, (2002) 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 at 1075; and Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
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is one of owner. While shareholders have various rights of 
‘ownership’ (i.e., to sell stock, vote proxies, sue directors, receive 
certain information, get residual pay-outs from corporation’s 
liquidation, etc.), it is not convincing to assert that shareholders 
own the corporation in the same way that people own their cars or 
houses. Moreover, even if it is conceded that shareholders are to be 
treated as ‘the owners of the corporation’, it by no means follows 
that they are entitled by virtue of that status to have the 
corporation run entirely in their sole interests. Whatever property 
ownership was originally considered to entail, the claims of 
property owners are no longer thought to be or enforced as if they 
were unreserved and trumped all other competing claims and 
interests: the rights of property owners are fundamental, but not 
absolute.12 
The ‘private property’ argument tends to beg the very question 
which it is intended to answer. In a democracy, private property 
has its important place, but it is not the foundational source of all 
other rights and no longer, if it ever was, the right against which 
all other claims are to be measured. Even when it comes to 
owning real property (e.g., a house or land) or personal property 
(e.g., cars or books), there is no entitlement that the owners’ 
interests and desires will always be given precedence over others’ 
interests; there are a whole host of codes, regulations, rules and 
conventions which curtail the freedom and entitlements of 
owners. Indeed, corporate law itself is chock full of examples 
which contradict the stark idea that shareholders ‘own’ the 
corporation—shareholders can be restricted as to whom they sell 
                                            
 12 S. BOWLES AND H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: 
PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN 
SOCIAL THOUGHT xi (1987). (It is entirely puzzling why “the rights of 
ownership prevail over the rights of democratic citizenry in determining who is 
to manage the affairs of a business enterprise whose policies might directly 
affect as many as half a million employees, and whose choice of product, 
location, and technology touches entire communities and beyond.”) 
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their shares, how they vote for management, when they must offer 
to buy others’ shares, etc. Furthermore, in an economy of 
relatively diffuse shareholding, many shareholders are decidedly 
passive by preference and have no interest in being involved in the 
management of the corporations in which they invest; the self-
image of the average investor is not one of corporate owner. 
Accordingly, as in almost all other areas of law, therefore, 
corporate shareholding does not comprise a black-and-white set of 
fixed entitlements, but is a very colourful, highly-shaded and 
dynamic process. It is now accepted that property ownership is a 
matter of social calculation in which individual interests are 
measured with and against other people’s interests.13 As the state 
creates and gives legal identity to corporations, it is for the state or 
the public to determine who gets ownership over it and what that 
ownership entails. As such, the ownership of a share will not 
convey any necessary rights on its owner nor will it necessarily 
amount to ownership of the corporation from which the shares 
arise. As with all property ownership, shareholding will consist of 
a bundle of rights whose content and extent will not be a natural 
given, but will vary over time and across contexts.  
B. MARKET DISCIPLINE 
The most sweeping defence of ‘shareholder primacy’ comes from 
economics-inspired scholars. The world of corporate governance is 
considered to be an informal institutional venue for self-interested 
and motivated entrepreneurs to enter a series of consensual deals 
to advance their own private economic interests. Although the 
market is far from being ideal or even optimal in its operations, it 
is touted as the preferred or least-worst alternative through which 
to co-ordinate productive endeavours and meet the mixed needs of 
its participants. From such a standpoint, the public regulation of 
                                            
 13 J. Waldron, Property Law in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 7 (D. Patterson ed. 1999) and THE RIGHT TO 
PROPERTY (1986). 
14 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 01 
 
 
corporate governance is considered to be merely facilitative rather 
than directive. Corporate actors are to be left to exercise their 
private discretion in determining what is best for particular 
corporations and, by virtue of that, the public interest: the market 
will fill the gaps and exact a penalty on the deviant few who 
engage in dubious activities and unreasonable practices.14 This 
competitive market behaviour is supposed to solve the separation 
of ownership and control by a variety of disciplinary devices—
minimizing agency costs (i.e., keeping managers in line with 
shareholder interests), containing the ever-present threat of take-
overs, responding to competition among firms for successful 
managers, monitoring share prices in the stock market, etc. 
Corporate law clearly favours the interests of shareholders over 
others because shareholders are more vulnerable as they are less 
able to find alternative outlets in the market for their services; 
they risk all their equity in the corporation’s ventures and 
therefore are entitled to greater protection by being beneficiaries of 
the directors’ fiduciary duty over the fate of the corporation. 
However, the confidence placed in the capacity of market forces to 
fulfill these onerous responsibilities seems extravagant and 
entirely suspect. The ‘great tragedy’ of economics, like so many 
other academic disciplines, is that it is one more beautiful theory 
brought to its knees by ugly facts—it is reductionist in its 
insistence in viewing all social conduct in terms of market 
behaviour; it manages, by giving everything a monetary value, to 
overvalue and undervalue much of human interaction; its leading 
concepts (voluntariness, transaction costs, etc.) are theoretically 
vague and practically indeterminate; it is ethically bankrupt in 
that it takes all personal preferences at face value and refuses to 
distinguish among them; it is self-serving in that it treats all 
                                            
 14 F. EASTERBROOK AND D. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC OF CORPORATE 
LAW 34 (1991). The ‘nexus of contracts’ idea is attributable to M. Jensen and W. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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personal preferences as independent of the social or market system 
in which they are generated and satisfied; it ignores the distinction 
between willingness to pay and ability to pay; and it celebrates 
individual autonomy over communal attachment.15  
Any plausibility that the market can operate as a disciplinary 
technique through which to advance the larger public good is 
confounded by the sheer size and influence of today’s corporations. 
These massive institutions begin to serve their own interests at 
the expense of everyone else’s and distort rather than personify the 
entrepreneurial spirit of a market economy. Even Berle and Means 
accepted this, although they were not prepared to act fully upon 
it.16 Accordingly, although many scholars preach the gospel of free 
markets, the cruel irony is that corporations are one of the greatest 
threat to the operation of free markets; competition is attenuated 
and limited to a few large players. As such, corporations have 
become super-citizens with enormous powers and influence that 
rival those of the state and the latter-day church, but with much 
less popular legitimacy and social accountability. Rather than be 
the justificatory underwriter of corporate institutions and 
enterprise, the validating operation of today’s market is effectively 
hobbled by the continuing involvement of today’s mega-
corporations.  
SOCIAL BENEFIT 
A third justification for ‘shareholder primacy’ is that it is the best 
way to ensure that corporate operations and profits work to the 
benefit of everyone in society: it is a ‘on a rising tide, all boats will 
rise’ defence. Although it might appear paradoxical, it is argued 
that, even though “ interests of shareholders deserve no greater 
                                            
 15 Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187 at 1198 (2002). 
 16 See infra at pp.**. 
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weight in this social calculus than do the interests of any other 
members of society, there is “as a consequence of both logic and 
experience, ... convergence on a consensus that the best means to 
this end ... is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those 
interests.”17 In short, it is contended that such that the more 
wealth generated in a society, the better off or more satisfied the 
whole of society will be. By holding corporate powers in trust for 
shareholders, it will be the same as holding corporate powers in 
trust for the entire community: any efforts (and this is 
proportionately true for the efforts of corporations) which 
contribute to the increased wealth of a society are to be applauded. 
In short, maximizing profits and increasing share prices will not 
only benefit everyone, but corporate profit-making and social 
service, far from being at odds with each other, can be understood 
as mutually-reinforcing aspects of the same enterprise. 
Despite its ingenious nature, this ‘rising tide’ defence of the 
desirability of prioritizing the pursuit of corporate profits in the 
social scheme of things is as unconvincing on second look as it is 
on first glance: it is unsupported by ‘logic’ and no evidence of 
‘experience’ is offered. There is surely no reason to accept at face 
value that, if a corporation declares profits of $1 million, social 
wealth is increased whether that profit is all distributed to one 
person, shared among the shareholders at large, spread among the 
various stakeholders, or distributed evenly among society. 
Economic growth will not in itself ensure that a society’s 
economic health, let alone its broader democratic or social health, 
is rude or improving. Indeed, many small boats are sinking or 
capsizing in this economic flow; their ability to stay afloat, let 
alone make progress, might well be in real danger. Accordingly, 
while a society’s overall economic growth is important and telling, 
                                            
 17 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 at 440 (2001). 
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it is not the sole or most important indicator of a society’s general 
condition and improvement. That being the case, there is no self-
evident reason to accept that an increase in its Gross Domestic 
Product is, without more, a consistent or convincing indication 
that a society is better off.18 Indeed, an increasing GDP may 
actually exacerbate social divisions. While an increase might 
usually be better than a decrease, the circumstances of the 
increase or decrease and the distribution of those gains or losses 
will need to be measured against a broader and less exclusively 
economic standard. If some smaller or less sturdy boats sink before 
the increasing tide, then that is the price of progress. But this 
response seems crass, at best, because it is difficult to take 
satisfaction in society’s overall increased wealth if there are still 
people who live in relative poverty and destitution.  
D. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 
The final rationale for ‘shareholder primacy’ is that it actually 
facilitates the achievement of democratic control over corporate 
activities and governance. The basic assertion is that, whatever 
the historical record suggests, the present distribution of 
shareholding is so diffuse and extensive that large corporations are 
actually controlled by society at large: more Americans own stock 
today than ever before. After all, the United States has one of the 
most widely-held corporate economies in the world with only 
about 20% of corporations being owned or controlled by a single 
shareholder.19 This developing trend is considered to have been 
                                            
 18 BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING 
INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005). For instance, the 
financial wealth of the top one percent of US households exceeds the combined 
wealth of the bottom 95 percent. See J. GATES, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: 
RESCUING MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET – A POPULIST VISION 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000). 
 19 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). 
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reinforced by the increasing role of institutional shareholders, like 
mutual funds and pension funds, which enable ordinary investors 
to participate in corporate affairs and exert their aggregated 
influence in a more effective manner. Indeed, some have 
commentators have gone so far as to suggest that plutocratic rule 
is at an end and that the age of “pension fund socialism’ is now 
upon us.20 
However, while these claims have some statistical credibility, 
their deeper significance is exaggerated. First, although more 
Americans hold more stocks than ever before, their distribution is 
heavily skewed—the bottom three-quarters of households own 
less than 15% of all stock, barely one-third hold more than $ 5,000 
in stock, and almost a half own no stock at all.21 This is very soft 
ground on which to support the claim that ‘shareholder 
                                            
 20 PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION 
FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976). Of course, this turn of events 
is not greeted with glee by all. The major rationale for an increased and active 
voice by institutional investors is that it will “increase corporate efficiency and 
value.” Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 at 887 (1992).  
 21 David Callahan, The Myth of the Populist Stock Market (January 8, 2004) 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR. Most Americans have more debt on their credit 
cards than money in their mutual funds. Between 1989 and 1997, 86% of stock 
market gains went to just the top 10% of households. these figures reflect the 
deeper inequality which pervades American society. In 2002, it was estimated 
that the United States’ Gini coefficient (a measure of relative income 
inequality) to be 0.394. Thus, income inequality in the United States is higher 
than in France (0.326), Belgium (0.246), Italy ( 0.306), Portugal (0.348), Greece 
(0.320), the Netherlands (0.311), Norway (0.247), Canada (0.310), Switzerland 
(0.324), the UK (0.354) and Australia (0.354), to name a few. Branko Milanovick 
and Shlomo Yitzhaki, Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the 
World Have a Middle Class?, 48 REVIEW OF INCOME AND WEALTH 155 
(2002). Also, between 1979 and 1989, the top 1% doubled its wealth from 22% 
to 39 % of the overall wealth and had captured 70% of all earnings growth since 
the mid-1970s. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH (2002). 
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democracy’ is alive and well. Not only does the unequal 
distribution of share-ownership fatally impair such claims, but the 
fact that most of these investors remain passive does little to 
bolster the claim. Indeed, the incidence of institutional 
investment has actually exacerbated the divide between 
ownership and control. Even greater power is concentrated in a 
small cadre of investing professionals who have enormous control 
over the market and seem intent on exercising it in order to 
aligning themselves closer to management so as to obtain further 
business and advance their own interests. For instance, a recent 
study reveals that mutual funds have a definite tendency to back 
executive-pay proposals and to oppose shareholder attempts to 
rein in such excesses: mutual funds support executive plans over 
shareholder opposition in almost 3 out of 4 instances.22 
Accordingly, while ensuring a more robust check on corporate 
management’s self-serving tendencies is not unimportant, it does 
not address the broader concerns of corporate governance in a 
democratic society. Not surprisingly, the advancement of private 
interests has been the primary goal of institutional investors; the 
public interest has taken a distinct second place or has been 
reduced to much the same as the aggregate maximization of 
private interest. There is, at best, a faux-democracy at work in 
contemporary corporate governance. 
                                            
 22 American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO 
and The Corporate Library, Enablers of Excess: Mutual Funds and The Overpaid 
American CEO (March 2006). 
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III. TOWARDS A NEW AGE 
If there is to be an end to corporate history, it is not the one that 
Hansmann and Kraakman reported or predicted. To paraphrase 
Winston Churchill, the first decade of the Twenty-First Century is 
not the end of corporate history, but it might well be the 
beginning of the end of one phase of corporate history and the 
beginning of another.23 Although we have entered the third 
millennium, society’s most important and influential institution 
remains decidedly Victorian, if not occasionally feudal, in its 
orientation and organisation. A small and unrepresentative elite of 
controlling shareholders, directors and management effect a 
command-and-control regimen over the lives and fates of 
countless people. Yet, there are now some encouraging indications 
that there is a nascent shift in public opinion and forbearance. Not 
only are people beginning to lose patience with corporations, but 
there are also some emerging efforts to rein in their power. It is 
important to seize this moment of institutional disaffection and 
turn it to greater democratic and transformative effect. If there is a 
crisis, it is as much one of political will as it is of normative 
decrepitude. As the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci put it, 
“the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and 
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of 
                                            
 23 Winston Churchill, Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Luncheon, Mansion House, 
London, November 10, 1942 (“This is not the end. It is not even the beginning 
of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”). For a sampling of the 
theorists who reject ‘shareholder primacy’, see Ronald M. Green, Shareholders 
as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell ed. 1995); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, [1990] DUKE L.J. 
201; Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life 
and Corporate Law, (1990) 68 TEXAS L. REVIEW 865; W. Leung, The 
Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy : A Proposed Corporate Regime that 
Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, (1997) 30 COL. J. OF LAW AND SOC. 
PROBS. 589; and G. Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The 
Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, (2002) 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 141. 
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morbid symptoms appears.”24 Indeed, the past few years have 
witnessed ‘a great variety of morbid symptoms’ in regard to 
corporate governance. 
The Enron saga and particularly the institutional response to it are 
probably most illustrative of this pathological condition. Indeed, 
the beleaguered company’s accounting scandals and the legislative 
response by way of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) are both 
decidedly derivative of and trapped within the paradigm of 
shareholder primacy; they present an indictment of the whole 
conceptual basis for corporate governance. As a reasonably stern 
response to shaken investor confidence in financial performance, 
SOX contains a series of measures intended to enhance corporate 
responsibility, improve financial disclosure and combat corporate 
and accounting fraud. To ensure more reliable processes of control, 
disclosure and auditing of financial results, rules are directed to 
improving the efficiency of audit committees, the independence of 
outside auditors, the implementation of internal procedures, and 
the like. In particular, senior executives of large publicly-traded 
corporations are required to validate the legitimacy of their 
performance reports by signing-off on them. Most of these 
measures are mandatory in nature and impose monetary and 
criminal penalties for violations, although the provisions about 
adopting a code of ethics for the CEO and senior financial officers 
only require that corporations disclose whether or not they have 
such codes and, if not, why not. From within the shareholder-
centred traditional paradigm, SOX is a relatively robust initiative 
and, as long as its rigorously enforced, will have some important 
and beneficial effects. 
Yet, while the legislative reforms might or might not improve 
auditing and budgetary controls, there was a singular failure on the 
part of regulators to appreciate that it was the single-minded focus 
                                            
 24 A. GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 210 (Q. 
Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith eds. 1971). 
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on maximizing shareholder-value that was at the heart of the 
problem. The Act is premised on the idea that the whole Enron 
debacle was attributable to management’s conflicts of interest 
which resulted from a lack of supervision by the board of 
directors.25 Consequently, the remedy was to be found in ensuring 
that executive behaviour was brought back into line with and 
disciplined by greater solicitude for the interests of shareholders 
through a more independent board of directors and external 
auditors. However, there is ample evidence that it was the single-
minded and irresponsible efforts by the management and board to 
inflate and maintain share prices and stock values that fueled the 
corporation’s demise. A continuing attachment to shareholder 
primacy was as much the problem as the solution.26 Until that 
underlying commitment is confronted and met, there will be little 
progress in moving forward and avoiding further Enron-like 
debacles. While it might be going too far to suggest that traditional 
models of corporate governance are priming large corporations to 
become accidents waiting to happen, it is entirely appropriate to 
recommend that there will be little progress in combating Enron-
like failures until there is a shift away from the shareholder-
primacy ideology which continues to dominate the theory and 
practice of corporate governance. 
                                            
 25 Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation made no real distinction between 
board and management (196) and, therefore, paid little attention to the power 
struggle within management to control the firm. Nor did they pay much 
attention to the existence and impact of inter-locking directorships and 
integrated corporate networks. As the scandals at Enron and other companies 
show, the board’s ability and appetite to monitor management is suspect at 
best. For a recent comparative analysis of corporate networks, see PAUL 
WINDOLF, CORPORATE NETWORKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED 
STATES (2002). 
 26 See Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, Learning From Enron, 12 
CORP. GOV. 134 (2004). For a very different take on SOX, see Roberto Romano, 
supra, note 3. 
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Accordingly, after a run of almost 150 years, the basic model for 
corporate regulation is in need of serious revision. The maladies 
that afflict corporate governance are no longer capable of being 
fixed by strong doses of reformist medicine. The time has come to 
effect a complete re-thinking of our fundamental theories about 
and expectations of corporations in modern Canadian society. As 
in mid-Nineteenth Century England, it is now imperative to bring 
about a massive transformation in the structure, organisation and 
outlook of large corporations. Up to the 1860s, there was the First 
Age of corporations in which they began life as state-sponsored 
enterprises to support the schemes and ambitions of fledgling 
nation-states in commerce and colonization. Between the 1860s 
and today, there has been the Second Age of corporations as 
private-controlled agencies for wealth accumulation and 
technological innovation. Giving birth to robber-barons, corporate 
raiders and dot.com billionaires, private corporations have become 
more global and only a little less exploitative in their operations as 
the state-directed agencies of old. There is now the need and, as 
importantly, the possibility for the emergence of a new paradigm 
for the corporation. The move away from a private conception of 
corporate life to a more public vision of corporations need most 
decidedly not be a misconceived return to the pre-1860 
understanding of corporations as delegated centres of state power. 
The new age of corporations must be one in which these vital 
organisations are treated as vibrant and democracy-enhancing 
vehicles for public and private benefit. Within such a newly-
emerging sensibility and milieu, the power and prestige of 
corporations can be harnessed to the realisation of a more 
democratic society generally. Indeed, precisely because 
corporations are so pervasive and so potent in their impact on 
most people’s daily lives, they offer a vital site at which to begin 
this paradigmatic overhaul. And the neglected sub-theme of Berle 
and Means’ Modern Corporation is an excellent place to begin that 
important endeavour. 
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IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE 
It seems to be the fate of almost all canonical texts that they not 
only become more cited than read, but that they are affixed with 
one received and uncontroversial meaning. Berle and Means’ 
classic monograph is wonderful proof of that tendency. If the great 
bulk of secondary literature is to be believed, The Modern 
Corporation comprises a series of secondary motifs around a 
primary theme—the need to bridge the gap between owners and 
management as much as the legal imposition of equitable duties 
can do so as to approximate the ideal situation of owner-managers. 
Yet, because a particular text has been accepted into the legal 
canon does not mean that the light it casts is clear or certain. 
Indeed, as with texts that have received canonical status in 
literature or precedents as part of the doctrinal canon, the meaning 
and instruction of legal texts often remain much richer and more 
contested than appreciated or conceded; they do not speak for 
themselves, but their re-reading is an occasion for valorized efforts 
at hermeneutical retrieval. For some, in law and literature, this 
richness and opacity are some of the qualities that recommend a 
text as great. In this sense, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the Supreme 
Court’s Roe are great not only because of their profundity, but also 
because of their profligacy.27 They have stood the test of time 
because of their richness and contestability, not in spite of them. 
Sadly, Berle and Means’ Modern Corporation has suffered a more 
orthodox fate. 
A. A RE-VISION 
Nevertheless, The Modern Corporation is not so easily pigeon-
holed and lends itself to convincing and suggestive alternative 
                                            
 27 See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT’S ALL IN THE GAME: A NON-
FOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION 86-115 
(2000). 
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readings. Although it has been appropriated by mainstream 
corporate law academics to invoke the ‘separation of ownership 
and control’ thesis to advocate stronger shareholder rights, the 
text’s “analysis was a gun on a rotating platform that could be 
pointed in more than one direction.”28 Indeed, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property is a profoundly challenging, yet 
schizophrenic book. It is, in large and traditionally-understood 
part, a nostalgic lament for a lost and traditional age of simple 
economic arrangements; this rendering has become the 
mainstream legacy of Berle and Means. But, in smaller and 
neglected part, it is also a romantic yearning for a new and 
revolutionary vision of social organisation. Once it is appreciated 
that “[s]ize alone tends to give these giant corporations a social 
significance not attached to the smaller units of private 
enterprise,” it is not so large a step to conclude that “new 
responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers, 
and the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control” (7). 
This alternative and more capacious reading comes alive when 
Berle and Means’ concern with the rise of the corporation as 
organisations which have “passed far beyond the realm of private 
enterprise ... [and] have become more nearly social institutions” 
(46) is placed front and centre ahead of the ownership-and-control 
thesis. Indeed, in 1932, they felt able to conclude The Modern 
Corporation with a chilling appraisal of American corporate 
power. They opined that not only did corporations represent “a 
concentration of economic power which can compete on equal 
terms with the modern state,” but also that “the modern 
corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social 
organisation, but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant 
institution of the modern world, ... possibly even superseding [the 
state]” (313). If that day of ‘actually’ has not yet arrived today, it is 
                                            
 28 J.A.C. Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law, 19 U. SAN. 
FRAN. L. REV. 229 at 235 (1985). 
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perilously closer; the march of corporate power has continued 
apace. In order to appreciate fully the extent to which corporations 
have consolidated and increased their economic sway, it is 
necessary to place their operations and performance in a wider 
global context. When this is done, the almost unrivalled 
dominance of these “non-statist collectivisms”29 in social and 
political as well as economic spheres can be grasped. 
If corporate sales and national GDPs are treated as inter-
changeable, corporations comprise about 50% of the world’s 100 
largest economies in the world. Of course, American corporations 
dominate the global group, with 82 representatives or 41% in the 
top 200 corporations: Japanese firms are second, with only 41 
representatives in the top 200. General Motors is now bigger than 
Denmark; Daimler-Chrysler is bigger than Poland; Royal 
Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is bigger than 
Singapore; and Sony is bigger than Pakistan. Indeed, the top 200 
corporations’ combined sales are bigger than the combined 
economies of all countries, except for the biggest 10. Also, the top 
200 corporations’ sales are growing at a faster rate than overall 
global economic activity. However, while the sales of the top 200 
corporations are the equivalent of 27.5% of world economic 
activity, they employ only 0.78% of the world’s workforce. 
Furthermore, although the those corporations’ profits grew 362.4% 
in the past 20 years or so, the number of people that they employ 
increases by only 14.4%. The economic clout of the top 200 
corporations is particularly staggering compared to that of the 
poorest segment of the world’s humanity: their combined sales are 
18 times the combined annual income of the 1.2 billion people or 
                                            
 29 Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xvi (E. 
Mason ed. 1959). 
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24% of the world’s total population living in ‘severe’ poverty 
(those surviving on less than $1 per day).30 
Once what Louis Brandeis termed the “curse of bigness” is placed 
in contemporary context,31 the concerns of Berle and Means 
become even more compelling. They appreciated that, because 
“the economic power in the hands of the few persons who control 
a giant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or 
benefit a multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the 
currents of trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to 
another,” (46) the people who exercised power over these 
burgeoning corporate empires would become the new “princes of 
industry” (4) and a new despotism would take hold. As such, it 
was essential that this enormous power “shall be subjected to the 
same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn 
to power otherwise located” (310) in modern society. In short, 
therefore, if ‘accountability’ is seen as the primary theme of the 
book, its concerns and proposals for change take on a very 
different emphasis and orientation. The private property owners 
became as much a part of the problem as the solution; their 
powers and entitlements must be harnessed to and disciplined in 
accordance with the public interest. When read in this way (and 
almost despite the efforts of the authors themselves), The Modern 
Corporation remains a robust and still relevant critique of 
corporate governance at the beginning of the Twenty-First 
Century. More importantly, it still resonates strongly as a rallying 
                                            
 30 Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global 
Power (Institute for Policy Studies, December 2000). 
 31 L. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (O. K. Fraenkel, ed. 1935). For 
more modern analyses along these lines, see GAR ALPEROVITZ, AMERICA 
BEYOND CAPITALISM: RECLAIMING OUR WEALTH, OUR LIBERTY, AND 
OUR DEMOCRACY (2005); W.K. CARROLL, CORPORATE POWER IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD: A STUDY IN ELITE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
(2004); and CARL BOGGS, THE END OF POLITICS: CORPORATE POWER 
AND THE DECLINE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2000). 
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call to popularist arms for all those who are committed to making 
the large modern corporation a worthy and welcome participant in 
the all-important project for democratic empowerment. 
B. SECOND THOUGHTS? 
In many ways, it was Berle and Means’ own ambivalence about 
pursuing the more radical implications of their critique which 
hindered efforts to move away from a ‘private property’ regime to a 
more fully public re-envisioning of the corporate role and 
responsibility. At the end of their celebrated monograph, they 
begin to build on the established fact that the modern-day 
shareholder has clearly “surrendered a set of definite rights for a 
set of indefinite expectations” (244). Indeed, they go so far as to 
concede that, with the entrenched separation of ownership and 
control, the shareholders’ “relation to [their] wealth” has changed 
and that the corporation should be seen as a public entity and “the 
logic applicable to that change should itself change” (298). Yet 
Berle and Means refused to take the next ‘logical’ step which was 
not only to accept the passivity of shareholders, but also to 
recognise that the very idea of the shareholder as property owner 
was no longer valid or applicable and that reliance on a ‘private 
property’ rationale for corporate governance was no longer 
compelling or desirable. 
Even on its publication in 1932, The Modern Corporation’s focus 
on the importance of the disjuncture between ownership and 
control did not persuade everyone. Dissenting voices could be 
heard, although their force and caution have long since been 
ignored. In particular, E. Merrick Dodd Jr. argued that corporate 
directors and officers should not be viewed solely as agents of 
shareholders, but should also be required to act as stewards for the 
interests of others, even if that meant curtailing the proprietary 
rights of those shareholders. Indeed, Edwin Dodd went so far as to 
suggest that managers might go further and actually consider 
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themselves to be “guardians of all the interests which the 
corporation affects and not merely servants of its absentee 
owners.”32 Berle took up the challenge and responded to Dodd by 
arguing that a broad corporate duty to serve society not only 
would violate shareholders’ private property rights, but would also 
be so vague as to put no meaningful constraint on managers’ use of 
corporate assets: “unchecked by present legal balances, a social-
economic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if 
benevolent, might be unsafe.”33 However, by the late 1950s, a 
chastened Berle seemed to have at least conceded considerable 
ground in his debate with Dodd. While he recognised that 
managerial discretion might be viewed as a positive attribute 
which could allow managers to act in the interests of society as a 
whole,34 Professor Berle insisted that he did not accept that Dodd 
was right in any absolute or prescriptive sense: “it is one thing to 
agree that this is how social fact and judicial decisions turned out 
[but,] ... it is another to admit this was the ‘right’ disposition; I am 
not convinced it was.”35 
By 1968, in their new and separate prefaces for The Modern 
Corporation, Berle and Means had begun to accept many of the 
limitations in the thinking that underlay the original edition. 
Nevertheless, they were still not fully prepared to abandon their 
established ways of thinking. After describing the even greater 
level of concentration and lack of genuine competition among 
                                            
 32 Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
at 1157 (1932). 
 33 Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
Rev. 1365 at 1372 (1932). 
 34 See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW 
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 107-10 (1959). 
 35 Berle, supra, note 29 at xii. 
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American corporations, the economist Means contented himself 
with simply asking “is the concentration of power in the 
management of the large corporations consistent with the 
maintenance of a democratic society?” (l). On the other hand, the 
law professor Berle stated that, while the nature of the property 
rights of shareholders has changed, there is still very much a 
property right at work. Although “a new classification has been 
superimposed on the old theory” (xxiii) and “the ‘private’ and, still 
more, individualized, aspects [of property] will become 
increasingly attenuated” (xxvi), there has now been a break-up of 
“the package of rights and privileges comprising the old 
conception of property” (xxxi). Nevertheless, Berle came back to 
the conclusion that , even though there has been a move away 
from treating stock as primarily a vehicle for raising capital and 
more “a channel for distributing income whose accumulation for 
capital purposes is not required” (xxix), the modern corporation 
and “property used in production [i.e., shares] must conform to 
conceptions of civilisation worked out through democratic process 
of American constitutional government” (xxxviii). He was 
convinced that the era of private corporations (or, at least, the 
understanding of corporations as extensions of private share-
holding) was no longer coherent in practice or theory. 
However, the time has come to take the obvious steps that Berle 
and Means illuminated, but felt unable or unwilling to pursue 
themselves. In a compelling conclusion to The Modern 
Corporation, they floated the idea of rejecting both a strengthening 
of the rights of passive investors and a realpolitik acceptance of 
managerial control. Instead, they offered the possibility that, 
because existing corporate arrangements had “cleared the way for 
the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the 
control [group],” the community could “demand that the modern 
corporation serve not [only] the owners or the control [group] but 
all society and that the governing principle of corporate 
governance should be “the paramount interests of the 
community” (312). Indeed, Berle and Means end with a hope that 
the separation between ownership and control will result not in a 
triumph by one faction over the other, but with the rise of a new 
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paradigm of corporate governance; “the law of corporations might 
well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new 
economic state.” (313). While they were wrong in believing that 
the control of corporations and the balancing of interests might be 
effected by “a purely neutral technocracy”, they were on the right 
track when they expressed the hope that this might be done “on 
the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity” (312-13). 
The challenge, therefore, is to move from ‘private cupidity’ to 
‘public policy’ while both retaining the best of private initiative 
and resisting the worst of a domineering state. This can be 
achieved by ushering in a new era of corporate history in which 
democracy is the standard and the goal of corporate governance. In 
such a vision, corporations might begin to function as a 
democratic nexus at which public and private, political and 
economic, individual and state, and personal freedom and civic 
responsibility meet. Corporations will be less an anomaly in 
contemporary democratic terms and more a primary site for the 
advancement of democratic politics. 
Before proceeding to sketch this democratic alternative, two 
preliminary caveats are worth mentioning. As critical as I am of 
the narrow scope and shallow substance of the existing model of 
corporate governance, none of my critique should be interpreted as 
trashing or rejecting those legal rules and doctrines which seek to 
control management in the name of some larger set of interests: 
no other group gains when managers self-deal. However, in 
supporting such disciplinary laws, it does not follow that the effort 
to discipline management should be done only on behalf of 
shareholders. From a more democratic perspective, profit 
maximization will not be eschewed entirely, but will simply no 
longer be the exclusive or pre-dominant goal among many other 
social ambitions—shareholders will be one kind of constituency 
member. Moreover, in recommending a shift away from the 
present paradigm, I am not suggesting that the whole idea of 
‘private property’ should be abandoned or, as some might propose, 
that the ‘means of production’ be put in public hands. I am as 
much against an overbearing state as a rampant private sphere. It 
is more that democracy should be used as a theory and a practice 
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to address the economic and social conditions of people’s lives as 
much as their civil and political entitlements; the market must be 
made to serve, not control people’s interests. In that, Milton 
Friedman is right in one important regard—the effort to extend the 
range of institutions and interests to which corporations owe 
obligations is a “fundamentally subversive doctrine.”36 However, 
while this effort might signal the end of the prevailing governance 
arrangements, it might also be the harbinger of a more democratic 
society. 
                                            
 36 M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (1962). 
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V. FROM CORPOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY 
In seeking to nurture and develop suitable forums and settings 
that are more local and less hierarchical and are more participatory 
and less private, large corporations recommend themselves as 
almost ideal locations for enabling people to become full citizens 
in their society. They stand squarely between the market and the 
government and they exert the kind of power which needs to be 
opened up if there is to be any real progress in closing the 
democratic gap between the governors and governed. Of course, 
such a political enterprise will demand that several crucial 
relations and contexts be transformed and reworked—those 
between corporations and the state; those inside corporations (i.e., 
shareholders, management and workers); and those between 
corporations and general public. Nevertheless, it is only if such a 
bold strategy to advance the democratic project is commenced that 
any real or meaningful change in the democratic condition 
generally and in corporate governance particularly can be 
expected. There are risks attached to such a commitment, but 
there are greater dangers to maintaining the status quo. 
A. A DEMOCRATIC GAMBIT 
In the quarter century since Lindblom’s conclusion that “the large 
corporation [does not fit] into democratic theory and vision”,37 the 
situation has hardly improved. Although the power and influence 
of corporate activities has continued to expand and deepen, a 
democratically-inspired agenda for corporate governance has lost 
much of the plot. Reform efforts remain too reactive, too 
piecemeal, too modest, and too trapped within the prevailing 
paradigm. In contrast, I want to offer, in the spirit of a reworked 
Berle and Means’ approach, an unabashedly and robust democratic 
                                            
 37 C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 356 (1977). 
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proposal for corporate law and governance. By understanding 
corporations as neither wholly public nor wholly private 
institutions, the hope is to move beyond the cramped language of 
the public/private and harness the traditional strengths of the 
corporate form to the more civic agenda of democracy. By 
envisaging and concretizing a democratic form of corporate 
organization, it might become possible to cultivate the kind of 
hybrid institution for civic interaction, both economic and 
political, which will be true to the democratic ambitions of all its 
participants. 
Despite all the recent and high-profile shenanigans of bad 
corporate behaviour, it would be mistaken to place all the critical 
focus on them. If any actual progress is to be made in confronting 
and improving corporate wrongdoing, it demands more than an 
ethical and criminal condemnation of such individual conduct. As 
important as that is, identifying and punishing corrupt or greedy 
executives whose conduct is castigated by almost everyone both 
outside and inside the corporate world is almost the easy part. 
What is much more difficult and necessary is to address the larger 
organisational structures and culture within which such roguery 
arises and persists. What presently passes as ‘good corporate 
governance’ is as much of a problem as the instances of bad 
corporate behaviour. It might be that, when corporate managers 
are doing their job best or, at least, well, they are doing most harm 
to society. This perverse state of affairs demands urgent appraisal. 
It is only when large corporations are understood and analysed in 
the larger setting of democracy that it will be possible to move 
forward. Indeed, it is only when corporations are obliged to 
become part of, rather remain apart from, democratic society more 
broadly that progress will be made. If we want ‘good corporate 
citizens’, then we must seek a sea-change in how we think about 
corporations, how we constitute them, how we regulate them, and 
what we expect of them. To ignore or marginalize such issues is to 
renege on the most basic of democratic ambitions. 
The fact that large corporations are major players in the political, 
economic and social system seems to be indisputable; they 
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exercise enormous power over the lives of ordinary people. While 
any accumulation of power must be treated with suspicion and 
mistrust in a democracy, there is no necessity to consider it 
illegitimate by its aggregation fact alone. Power is not the problem 
in and of itself, but the basis for its exercise and legitimacy. When 
it comes to the pedigree and consequences of corporate power, 
there is a considerable burden on its operatives and apologists to 
offer a suitable series of justifications; corporate power seems 
presumptively undemocratic, if not actually anti-democratic. 
Because the goal of shareholder primacy has become “second 
nature to politicians,”38 it will be necessary to offer a pragmatic 
alternative to the neo-liberal philosophy which has proven so 
effective in insulating large corporations from regulation and 
regeneration in the public interest. As the line between 
government and business has become increasingly blurred, 
politicians are persuaded that government’s only legitimate role is 
to facilitate business. As one critic pointedly notes, “while the 
business of government seems more than ever to be business, the 
business of business ... [is] increasingly becoming that of 
government.”39 
Despite its many different and innovative efforts, traditional 
theorizing has failed to make a persuasive case for how the 
modern corporation can be reconciled with the rhetoric and reality 
of democratic governance in contemporary society. In particular, a 
major source of bewitchment in this process is the conceptual 
tendency to insist that there is an almost cast-iron distinction 
between public undertakings and private interests. Whereas the 
former are considered to be the legitimate domain for democratic 
participation, the latter are treated as something aside from that. 
In this formalised approach, emphasis is placed on the source and 
                                            
 38 Hansmann and Kraakman, supra, note 9 at 468. 
 39 NOREENA HERTZ, THE SILENT TAKEOVER: GLOBAL CAPITALISM 
AND THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY 190 (2001). 
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pedigree of power rather than its effects and consequences. In a 
world of such enormous corporate power and influence, such a 
disciplinary device is almost guaranteed to ignore and even 
condone extensive abuses of power. It guts the whole 
emancipatory dynamic of accountability and makes democracy 
safe for the private exercise of corporate power. In short, large 
corporations are the favoured offspring of neo-liberalism’s 
attachment to the public-private distinction.40  
B. BEYOND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
Yet, when viewed from a thoroughly democratic perspective, the 
operations and decision-making of the modern corporation cannot 
be immune from public oversight in the public interest. It is the 
‘abuse of power’ in substantive and real terms which is the focus 
of attention. The formal source of power is secondary to its effects 
and deprivations. Reliance on a strict public-private distinction 
exacerbates the pernicious effects of privatised corporate power on 
people’s lives. Of course, it does not follow that, when understood 
as “the dominant institution of the modern world” (313), 
corporations are to be treated in the same way as other large-scale 
public institutions by having the full panoply of duties and 
responsibilities under the administrative or even constitutional 
law regime imposed on them by the courts. This is to 
misunderstand both the nuanced and pluralistic insights of 
democratic governance and the structural and democratic 
limitations of judicial review. Although it is important to 
appreciate large corporations as remote and bureaucratic 
institutions and to emulate the particpatory ambitions of modern 
administrative law, it is both unwise and impractical to aggregate 
even further power in the courts; their own democratic legitimacy 
is sufficiently fragile and contested to caution against an extension 
                                            
 40 See Morton Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982). 
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of judicial review’s existing reach.41 Instead, a different and more 
substantive set of measures must be introduced which can grapple 
more directly and effectively with the substantive and formal 
dimensions of what counts as ‘good corporate governance’. If 
corporations can be made to function as a democratic nexus at 
which public and private, political and economic, individual and 
state, and personal freedom and civic responsibility meet, they 
will become less an anomaly in contemporary democratic terms 
and more a primary site for the advancement of democratic 
politics. 
At the heart of a democratic compact will be a re-invigoration of 
the neglected fact that the corporate form is a distinctly public-
created institution which is brought into existence by the state 
and has certain conditional powers delegated to it by the state. As 
constructions and emanations of the state, modern corporations 
have a distinctly public origin and a decidedly public purpose.42 
The debate about corporate governance is, therefore, about the 
nature and parameters of those public purposes. Once corporations 
are understood in this way, it no longer continues to be a question 
of whether it is appropriate or reasonable to ask corporate owners 
and administrators to pursue the public interest at all. Instead, the 
more telling issue is what public interests should the corporation 
pursue and how it should go about formulating and 
operationalising them. The advancement of private interests will 
remain important, but will not exhaust the ‘public interest’. By 
availing themselves of the advantages of incorporation, investors 
and entrepreneurs are entering into a bargain with the state and 
the community—in return for the benefits of pursuing their 
private ambitions through the corporate form, people must accept 
                                            
 41 See, for example, CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990). 
 42 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 655 (1926). 
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the public responsibilities and costs that come with it. 
Shareholders and stakeholders would become simply different 
kinds of members who would include owners, directors, managers, 
workers, customers, suppliers, lenders, neighbours, community, 
etc. 
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VI. A DEMOCRATIC AGENDA 
There will be nothing easy about determining for the purposes of 
corporate governance which groups are to classify as members, by 
what means their interests are to be ascertained, how to ensure 
that those interests are adequately represented, and on what basis 
those often competing interests are to be to weighed and balanced. 
However, a commitment to democracy demands that such efforts 
be made.43 While a variety of strategies lend themselves to this 
emancipatory project, I will concentrate on four particular 
initiatives—limits on limited liability; a broadening of directors’ 
fiduciary duties; the increased representativeness of the board; and 
the enactment of substantive regulatory standards. While each of 
these innovations are not novel in themselves, they will, when 
taken together as a package, help to bring about a genuine and 
thoroughgoing change in the democratic thrust of corporate 
governance. 
A. LIMITED LIABILITY 
Although the limited liability of corporations is considered to be 
one of the main attractions of incorporation as it encourages 
investment at less risk and with greater diversification, it has 
some severe shortcomings—it tends to re-allocate risk rather than 
reduce it; it places this re-allocated risk on those stakeholders (e.g., 
employees, neighbours, etc.) often less able to shoulder it; and it 
can encourage riskier behaviour as corporations are excused from 
internalizing the full costs of their risky behaviour.44 However, in 
                                            
 43 I have begun the effort to flesh out practical strategies to meet these 
challenges in a Canadian context. See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE 
COMPANIES WE KEEP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR A 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (2006). 
 44 Compare F. EASTERBROOK AND D. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) with Ronald M. Green, 
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order to make democratic sense of this debate, it is necessary keep 
a broader and more encompassing view of corporate activity. After 
all, as I have been at pains to emphasise, the whole notion of 
‘governance’ implies much more than simply doing profitable 
business; it suggests a public and accountable aspect to the 
dealings of the corporation which encompasses, but is not only 
reducible to private gain and economic profitability. When 
understood from a democratic perspective, it is the limits of 
limited liability rather than limited liability itself which must be 
re-configured. 
Under such a democratic conception of corporate governance, it 
seems entirely unconvincing to establish an institutional 
framework for legal liability which shifts almost all the costs onto 
some persons and all the benefits onto different persons. At the 
moment, on the one hand, there is management/shareholder 
control without responsibility and, on the other hand, there is 
stakeholder responsibility without control. This is anathema to 
the democrat who is committed to closing, not maintaining the 
gap between the powerful and the less powerful. If people claim 
the rights of ownership and the authority to govern the 
corporation in their own best interests, it seems almost axiomatic 
that they should at least bear some responsibility for its actions 
and behaviour. That being said, if the shareholder’s lack of 
responsibility is to continue to any extent, then there seems no 
compelling reason to object to the reduced control of shareholders 
or their displaced focus as the corporation’s main concern. From a 
democratic perspective, the price of limited liability is the cost of 
reduced influence. While there are also other legal mechanisms by 
which to reduce negative externalities created by corporate 
conduct (i.e., general welfare laws designed to deter corporate 
conduct through criminal and civil sanctions), the imposition of 
                                                                                                                
Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993). 
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some liability in some circumstances on shareholders seems 
democratically optimal.45  
Rather than take an all-or-nothing stance, it is better to provide a 
series of initiatives that can be combined to effect the limited and 
selective availability of limited liability. Possible legal strategies 
for limiting limited liability include narrowing its scope to 
contractual risk as opposed to tort liability, introducing pro rata 
liability for shareholders,46 lifting the corporate veil more, 
imposing selective liability on controlling shareholders, abolishing 
limited liability for shareholding corporations, and greater 
vicarious liability of directors in certain circumstances.47 Each has 
the distinct potential to effect a more acceptable balance of control 
and risk; traces of each approach can already be detected in 
corporate law. But, when understand as part of an integrated and 
democratic approach to corporate governance, they can work 
together to provide a more subtle, balanced and measured 
solution. 
                                            
 45 The available historical and empirical evidence strongly suggests that there 
would be little effect on the operation and innovativeness of capital markets if 
there was a reduction in limited liability. See P. Blumberg, Economic 
Dimensions: The Role of Limited Liability in THE MULTINATIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW (1993) and H. Grossman, The Market 
for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case of American 
Express, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (1995). 
 46 See Theresa Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections 
on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387 
(1992) and Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). 
 47 See Timothy Glynn, Beyond ‘Unlimiting’ Shareholder Liability: Vicarious 
Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2004). 
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B. EXTENDED DUTIES 
The next step in transforming the modern corporation into a more 
democratic and more public-oriented institution is to take 
seriously the assertion that the board of directors must exercise 
their powers and fulfil their fiduciary duties ‘in the best interests 
of the corporation’. In defining which interests best comprise the 
corporation, it will be necessary to take a more expansive view 
than the limited focus on the interests of one set of stakeholders, 
namely the shareholders. Such interests are entirely deserving of 
consideration, but they will be only one set of interests to be taken 
into the balance and not the exclusive or primary ones. The ghost 
of Dodge must be exorcized once and for all.48 The corporation is 
an organic entity with multiple and shifting constituents whose 
interest will vary over time and in different contexts; no one set of 
interests will have their thumb on the governance scales. In 
advancing the welfare of the corporation, it will be important to 
assess the directors’ performance over an extended time-frame 
rather than on a single decision basis; the best interests of the 
corporation will not be reducible to a simple formula or set of 
fixed interest. This will be a challenging undertaking for directors 
and one that will demand a variety of skills and sensitivities. 
Traditional critics will be right to point out that such general 
obligations will not easily be rendered operational, instilled with 
specific substance or given effective teeth; this broad 
responsibility can become a shield to justify any action by the 
board. As Berle himself observed, “unchecked by present legal 
balances, a social-economic absolutism of corporate 
administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe.”49 These are 
                                            
 48 Dodge v. Ford, 204 Mich. 459, 170 NW 668 (1919). 
 49 Berle, supra, note 33. See also FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LIBERTY AND 
LEGISLATION: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE vol. 3, 82 
(1979). 
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reasonable objections, but insufficiently compelling to derail the 
whole project. 
As things presently stand, the directors must often balance the 
competing interests of different shareholders in a constantly 
shifting market—Are long-, medium- or short-term interests of the 
shareholders to be served? Are directors to concentrate on 
increasing production and dividends or managing the share price? 
How is equity to be ensured among majority and minority 
interests? These are far from easy questions and require 
considerable sophisticated judgment on the part of the directors. 
Of course, extending the directors’ fiduciary duty to stakeholders 
will not lessen that challenge. But it will not move it into a 
qualitatively different realm of operational difficulty. There are 
already several fiduciary relationships imposed by law (e.g., 
executors) which encompass duties to a class of persons or groups 
whose interests might well be far from unitary or readily 
compatible. Consequently, while demanding and difficult, the 
application of a broader fiduciary duty is certainly not outside the 
competence of sophisticated businesspersons. Rather than be an 
exceptional duty, the fiduciary responsibility of directors would be 
brought in line with the thematic principle that fiduciaries are to 
be held “to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace; 
... only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a 
level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”50 In the campaign to 
democratise the corporation, this seems an essential and welcome 
reform. 
C. REPRESENTATIVE BOARDS 
Corporate duties to stakeholders are an improvement, but they are 
not a lasting or substantial solution and their effects will be 
muted. Unless there is a change in the composition of those 
                                            
 50 Reinhard v. Salmon, 249 NY 458 (1928) at 464 per Cardozo J. 
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entrusted with the power and responsibility to run the 
corporation, it will always be what managers or shareholder-
appointed directors think is in the best interests of the broader 
stakeholder community rather than stakeholders being able to 
determine that for themselves. After all, democracy is not only 
supposed to be for the people, but of the people. No matter how 
benign or progressive the decisions made by elite groups may be, 
they remain decisions which lack the important imprimatur of 
democratic participation: accountability is only a poor second to 
participation as a mode of democratic governance. As with other 
institutions and agencies charged with advancing the public 
interest, there is a compelling need for public participation. 
Accordingly, as well as reforming the rules for proxy voting, 
strenuous efforts must be made to introduce reforms which will 
facilitate involvement by those stakeholder groups whose interests 
are directly and substantially at stake in corporate behaviour. 
However, because the potential effects of large-scale corporate 
activities are truly wide-ranging and often global, this challenge is 
beset by practical difficulties. The two main initiatives to date for 
dealing with this conundrum are ‘diversified shareholding’ and 
‘independent directors’. While they both make important in-roads 
into present arrangements, they fall short of any truly democratic 
goal. Whereas ‘independent directors’ are themselves appointed by 
and are often beholden to the existing shareholder-appointed 
board, ‘diversified shareholding’ tends to reinforce the existing 
scheme of corporate governance by perpetuating the idea that 
financial contribution is the best measure of democratic 
participation.51 When employees become shareholders, the real 
threat is that they become persuaded to adopt the same purely 
                                            
 51 Also, apart from the dangers of co-optation, employees might actually 
become more vulnerable because, if the corporation gets into serious problems, 
they will stand to lose not only their jobs, but also their savings. See K. 
MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 93-108 (1997). 
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economic mentality to corporate planning and success as today’s 
shareholders; they will be more interested in short-term gains in 
the secondary stock market than in long-term contributions to the 
primary goods-and-services and jobs market. 
A more convincing avenue of democratic reform would be to 
introduce independence and diversification in a more direct 
manner. For instance, it might be possible to divided affected 
persons and stakeholders into three main constituencies. Each 
constituency would represent and give increased involvement to 
different members of the corporate community. The three 
constituencies would be the shareholders, the employees, and the 
other stakeholders or the public. As regards the shareholder 
constituency, all shareholders might have the same entitlements 
and responsibilities with no one shareholder being able to exercise 
more than 25% of the overall total of votes available to 
shareholders. When it came to the employees, all existing and 
permanent employees, part-time and full-time as well as 
management and rank-and-file, would be eligible to vote for a 
fraction of the board: those who stood for election as employee-
representatives would themselves have to be employees. Finally, 
as regards the public constituency (which would include all other 
stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, customers, local 
community, etc.), there might be an attempt to designate a 
fraction of the board as ‘general public directors’ whose mandate 
would be to represent the public interest as it applies to the 
operations of a particular corporation. These directors could be 
selected by a fractional vote of the rest of the already-elected board 
of shareholder- and employee-representatives from a list of 
approved candidates maintained by a public agency which would 
have ultimate authority to approve or disapprove such elected 
persons as being suitably diverse and pertinent to the specific 
corporation’s operations.52 In order to be admitted to this list, 
                                            
 52 See infra, pp.36-37. This proposal for ‘public interest directors’ draws on a 
neglected and before-its-time idea by Christopher Stone. See CHRISTOPHER 
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candidates would have to satisfy the regulatory body that they not 
only had general directorial competence, but that they also 
appreciated the public role and democratic responsibilities of 
corporations.  
By establishing such a balanced scheme of membership, certain 
important advantages will accrue. Apart from the general 
conformity of the proposal to a democratic vision of corporate 
governance, the most obvious benefits are twofold. First, even if 
individual directors take a very self-regarding stance by pushing 
only for the interests of those groups who elected them, they will 
still have to persuade others of the more general wisdom of that 
stance. It will likely require a more long-term approach to 
directorial debate so that priorities and plans will be able to 
proceed on a more consensual basis. Also, being exposed to 
different perspectives might well loosen the more parochial 
concerns of particular directors. Moreover, the active presence of 
the ‘public directors’ will oblige other directors to develop and 
frame their views in ways which are more conducive to the 
promotion of the general public interest. Secondly, because the 
board of directors would be under a broad fiduciary duty to 
advance the interests of the whole corporation, the considerable 
challenge of balancing competing interests and objectives might be 
more easily accomplished. By having a more diverse and 
representative board, an appreciation of what is in the best 
interests of the corporation as a whole will be more informed and 
immediate: the various stakeholder communities will have a 
direct voice in discussions. This will also help to de-stabilize the 
ruling elite which presently has a virtual lock on corporate 
decision-making and culture. Accordingly, the odds on making the 
                                                                                                                
STONE, WHERE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE 
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democratic wager are significantly shortened by the appointment 
of a more diverse and representative board of directors.53 
D. SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES 
Nevertheless, while such reforms in representation will be 
extremely important, they again will not be sufficient in 
themselves to implement a democratic system of corporate 
governance. The introduction of more stakeholder-representative 
boards, greater responsibility for corporate actors and beneficiaries, 
and better protections for minority shareholders will be vitally 
important. But they will not be enough. If the goal is to ensure 
that large corporations act in a more democratically and 
responsive manner, it will also be essential to lay down certain 
minimum substantive standards against which corporate 
performance and behaviour can be judged. Accordingly, there will 
need to be a mix-and-match balance between structural reform 
and substantive regulation. As traditional scholars insist, it is 
naive to believe that asking present corporate officers to act 
responsibly for the benefit of stakeholder communities will be 
sufficient or that making structural changes without some 
accompanying ethical shift will achieve a marked degree of 
                                            
 53 The proposal that various stakeholders might have a voice or part in the 
governance of a firm is far from novel or radical. In Germany (and Japan), for 
example, it is mandated by the Mitbestimmung (workers co-determination) law 
that there is to be worker representation on the supervisory boards of large 
public corporations. While the impact of this innovation should not be 
exaggerated, it has not brought German capitalism to its knees. Indeed, some 
might argue that it has been a contributing factor in the relative success of 
German industry. See Peter Cornelius and Bruce Kogut, Creating the 
Responsible Firm: In Search for A New Corporate Governance Paradigm, 4 
GERMAN L. J. 45 (2003). Moreover, the fact that such arrangements are now 
being dismantled does not speak to their democratic desirability or efficacy: it 
does speak to the globalizing pressure of a shareholder-centric approach. 
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democratic modification.54 In order for there to be genuine change 
and transformation in corporate behaviour, it will be necessary for 
society as a whole to participate in the continuing responsibility of 
determining what is ‘in the public interest’. As public institutions 
and government-created ones at that, corporations must at a 
minimum be obliged to ensure that they do not act in a way that 
is inimical to the public interest. As things presently stand, the 
‘public interest’ is too often a by-product of what happens to 
advance corporate and private interests at any given time and 
place. In a democracy, it is for the public through democratic 
institutions and processes to determine what that public interest 
is; it is not for corporations either by design or default to 
appropriate that task entirely for themselves alone. 
As well as improved transparency in corporate transactions and 
dealings, it would also be necessary to introduce mandatory 
disclosure and reporting on a whole range of economic and social 
issues that might include, for example, information on the 
products a company produces and the countries in which it does 
business; on the corporation’s law compliance structure; on its 
domestic labour practices; on its global labour practices and 
supplier/vendor standards; on its domestic and global 
environmental effects; on corporate charitable contributions, 
political contributions, or the effects of using a corporation’s 
products on consumer health and safety.55 However, if corporate 
governance is to be taken seriously on its own terms, the 
enactment and enforcement of such regulations must not be left 
only to securities regulators. While the protection of shareholder 
                                            
 54 Whether the goal is profit-maximization or something broader, substantial 
change will require even optimal laws to be supplemented by social and moral 
sanctions. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public 
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). 
 55 See Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999). 
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interests is a necessary feature of any advanced economy, it is not 
and should not be the only game in town. Of course, it is not 
surprising that the authorities persist in treating corporate 
governance as largely about the protection of shareholders 
interests alone when the informing vision of corporate governance 
is so shareholder-centred in orientation, content and enforcement. 
Accordingly, under a democratic model of corporate governance, it 
will be essential to create and empower a public regulatory body 
whose exclusive responsibility is to deal squarely with corporate 
governance in its own right and not only as a function of the 
protection of shareholder interests. Because the size and power of 
large modern corporations has assumed such significance, it is 
clear that they warrant their own regulatory body. 
E. DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM 
Finally, in offering this robust critique of contemporary 
approaches to corporate law and governance, it bears emphasizing 
that my intention has not been to defend the claim that 
productivity or profit-making is a bad thing. Nor am I 
recommending that all jobs will be forever safe or that the 
workers’ and other stakeholders’ interests will always outweigh 
those of shareholders. This would be plain silly. There is nothing 
wrong with productivity, efficiency, profitability, etc. Indeed, they 
are essential values for any modern society to embrace and foster. 
But it is the elevation of such values to a cluster of meta-values 
against which all social processes and other values must be judged 
that is the problem. As both a matter of historical record and as an 
issue of public policy, it is mistaken to suggest shareholder-value 
maximisation is or ought to be the sole or primary goal of the 
business corporation. This would be, as an incredulous critic 
notes, “to define the business corporation ... as a kind of shark that 
lives off the community rather than as an important agency in the 
construction, maintenance, and transformation of our shared 
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lives.”56 In particular, there is no sense in thinking about large 
corporations as a democratic venue for democratic engagement 
between political equals. While a cost-benefit analysis is necessary 
and desirable, it ought to be the first step in making any corporate 
decision, not the first, last and only consideration. The process of 
formulating benefits and entitlements is important in itself under 
a democratic theory; an appreciation of the social context within 
which individuals exist and thrive is essential. 
There is simply no reason to be persuaded that capitalism and 
democracy are somehow synonymous.57 Indeed, the link between 
capitalism and democracy is weak at best and counter-productive 
at worst. If capitalism is to remain, then it must serve rather than 
master the interests of democracy. Citizens are entitled to basic 
economic protections by virtue of their membership in society and 
not only through their efforts at contractual negotiations. 
Democrats appreciate that, while everything has a cost, that is not 
the sole measure of value: citizens are not only consumers. And 
Democracy is not only or best sold in the marketplace. Indeed, as 
Amy Chua has noted, “markets concentrate wealth, often 
spectacular wealth, in the hands of the market-dominant 
minority, while democracy increases the political power of the 
                                            
 56 White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages of 
Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 at 1419 (1985). See also See 
LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S 
NEWEST EXPORT (2001). 
 57 For a sophisticated attempt to portray ‘market economics’ as an (American) 
article of faith, see ROBERT NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM 
SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND BEYOND (2001). See also G. SOROS, 
OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2000) and JOHN KAY, 
THE TRUTH ABOUT MARKETS: THEIR GENIUS, THEIR LIMITS, THEIR 
FOIBLES (2003). 
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impoverished majority.”58 The obvious challenge is to ensure that 
politics is played out throughout social life and not merely 
confined to areas outside the economic sphere; people are entitled 
to participation and accountability in their dealings with and 
inside businesses as much as with politicians and governments. 
Accordingly, a shift to more democratically-structured 
corporations will likely galvanize the democratic instinct 
generally. As President Woodrow Wilson famously opined, “the 
cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, not less.” 
                                            
 58 A. CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET 
DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY ** 
(2003). 




Recent events in corporate governance have at least opened up a 
space to think seriously about how it might be possible to turn the 
present system’s failings to transformative effect. Indeed, with 
effort and imagination, it might presently be possible to bring to 
an end the age of the corporation as a private-controlled agency for 
wealth accumulation. Uncoupled from ‘market capitalism’ and 
hitched to a more democratic vision, the institution of the 
corporation can become a social, political and economic 
organisation in which public, political and distributive ends are in 
play as well as private, economic and productive ones. Berle and 
Means’ The Modern Corporation has a definite contribution to 
make to that project provided that its traditional reading is 
abandoned and its more enlightened alternative theme is 
emphasised; there must be a shift from ‘private property’ to 
‘democratic accountability’ such that public policy is not only 
consistent with private cupidity. When large corporations are 
understood and analysed in the larger setting of democracy, it will 
be possible to move forward. By carrying out such a democratic 
stock-taking, it might then be possible to provide a more telling 
critique of corporate governance and to offer more constructive 
proposals for change. Indeed, it is only when corporations are 
obliged to become part of, rather than remain apart from, 
democratic society more broadly that progress will be made.  
But the present conditions of decay and deterioration will only last 
for short time. Given opportunities and intellectual backing, the 
old habits and entrenched arrangements might re-assert 
themselves. In the meantime, it is essential that those who take 
the democratic imperative seriously act quickly and decisively; 
the opportunity might not come again or soon. The seventy-fifth 
anniversary of Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means’ The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property could be celebrated in 
no more fitting or timely way than with such a initiative. Indeed, 
it might well be that, as goes corporate governance, so goes 
democracy. 
